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A

CANADA UPDATE:

CASE INVOLVING

LIMITATIONS ON FREE SPEECH; THE
ARTICLING PROBLEM AND PROPOSED
SOLUTION;

A

SUMMARY OF

LEGISLATIVE AND UPCOMING
REGULATORY CHANGES:
HYDROFRACKING, WIRETAPPING,
AND SELF-DEFENSE

THIS

David Paulson*

article begins with a brief summary and analysis of a recent

decision by the Supreme Court of Canada. The case involved the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting hate speech. Next, this
article takes a look at an increasing problem that recent law graduates
face: securing an articling position. Then, three recently proposed
changes to legislation and regulation are given a brief overview.
I. SASKATCHEWAN (HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION) V.
WHATCOTT: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF
THE LIMITATIONS ON FREE SPEECH
In February of 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered an opinion that addressed the limits of free speech. Saskatchewan passed a statute that prohibited, in pertinent part, any person to "publish or display,
or cause or permit to be published or displayed ... any representation ...
that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise
affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a
prohibited ground."' The only questions before the Court were: whether
the statute was constitutional and, if so, whether the application of the
statute was correct. 2 Like so many questions of constitutional law, the
Paulson graduated from SMU Dedman School of Law in 2013. He served
as the Reporter on Canada for the International Law Review Association. He
would like to thank his family and friends for the support they have given him
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1. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, para. 12
(Can.).
2. Id. para. 5.
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issue was not whether this violated the defendant's right of expression or
free speech, but whether the limitation was reasonable.
A. FAcrs
The case began when Mr. Whatcott distributed four different kinds of
flyers. All of the flyers shared a similar theme, which centered on condemning homosexuality and arguing to keep homosexuals away from
public schools and children. 3 The Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal
found the defendant in violation of this statute and fined him $17,500.4
The framework the Court relied on in analyzing this statute is found in
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, a case from 1990.5 While
this case involved the limits that may be placed on the freedom of speech
as well as the freedom of religion, this paper will primarily address the
portions concerning free speech; the analysis is similar for both questions.
1. The Definition of "Hatred"
One of key factors in determining the constitutionality of this statute is
the meaning of the word "hatred." While this could be considered a
vague or undeterminable standard, there must be some point of reference
for the definition and Canadian jurisprudence has not had much difficulty
coming up with an objective test.
Since 1990, when Taylor was decided, there have been a number of
cases interpreting the word "hatred" as it appears in human rights legislation. These cases have interpreted the definition of "hatred," as set out
by Taylor, to be something more than a "merely offensive or hurtful expression." 6 Generally, only "extreme and egregious" statements have
been categorized as hate speech. Indeed, the purpose of the legislation
making hate speech a punishable offense is not to end hatred, but to end
extreme types of expression that have "a potential to incite or inspire
discriminatory treatment against protected groups on the basis of a prohibited ground." 7 The focus of the inquiry is on whether the speech in
question would be the precipitating factor in the discrimination or harm
of those to whom the speech is directed. 8 Only if the answer is yes should
the speech be considered hate speech. Now that the limitation is defined,
the question of whether this limitation is constitutional can be addressed.
B.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. The Pressing and Substantial Need Analysis
To justify the limiting of this right, the first question the Court asks is
3. Id. app. B.
4. Id. para. 11.
5. Id. paras. 20-46.

6. Id. para. 46.
7. Id. para. 48.
8. See id. paras. 54, 58.
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whether the need is pressing and substantial. 9 Often some amount of deference is given to the legislature in responding to this question.10 But
here, where the right involved is enumerated, the Court closely scrutinized this statute to ensure it was indeed rational connected to a pressing
and substantial need."

When viewed through the lens of the preceding

paragraph, with an understanding of what "hatred" is interpreted to
mean, this answer should be clear. If what the Court is talking about is
words that are so egregious that they act as a catalyst for attacks ranging
from discrimination to genocide, then the need probably is pressing and
substantial. This is not a matter of hurting someone's feelings, but rather
a question of whether the very real possibility of causing another physical
or economic harm justifies limiting another person's freedom of
expression.
In this case, the Court also explains that when hate speech has the effect of cutting off a particular group from participating in the political
process this is also an injury that justifies limiting free expression. 12
While this may not appear as devastating as physical injury, the reality is
that when this occurs the ostracized group has effectively been stripped of
its fundamental right to free speech. And it seems rather disingenuous to
argue that one's fundamental rights should not be limited in circumstances where, if left unbridled, it would trample on the fundamental
rights of another.
2.

The ProportionalityAnalysis

The next question, proportionality, involves three parts: (1) whether
the means are rationally connected to the end, (2) whether the limit
causes minimal impairment of the right, and (3) whether the benefit of
the statute outweighs the limitation.
The Court concluded that while there is a rational basis for prohibiting
speech that could reasonable cause harm to another, there is no rational
basis for prohibiting speech that "ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts
the dignity of any person or class of persons." 13 Accordingly, the Court
struck this language from the statute and held it was unconstitutional.
Then the Court, in a very detailed analysis, examined whether the statute was minimally invasive.14 While there is not room here to discuss
each point, the conclusion was simple: after the portion the Court struck
as unconstitutional was removed, what remained was a minimally invasive way to attack the problem of speech that could effectuate actual
harm on another.' 5
The last portion of the proportionality analysis is whether the benefit
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. paras. 68-69.
Id. para. 78.
Id. paras. 79-100.
Id. para. 75.
Id. paras. 12, 99.
Id. paras. 101-146.
Id. paras. 145-146.
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outweighs the effect this statute has on limiting freedom of expression. 16
Here the main question is whether this will have a chilling effect on the
freedom of expression.' 7 The Court held that the benefit did outweigh
the detriment. If the enforcement of the statute was not so tapered, perhaps the Court may have been more hesitant in making this determination. But if one is found in violation, there is no possibility of jail, the
instances of fines are rare, there are no punitive damages allowed, and
there are mechanisms in place to allow for mediation and settlement.
C.

THE RULING

The Court partially affirmed the findings of the Saskatchewan Human
Rights Tribunal, but the approach the Court took was markedly different
from the Tribunal's approach. The Court followed the framework of Taylor and really only took issue with the flyers that objectively met this
definition of hate speech.
The flyers that the Court determined were in violation of the statute
did more than simply preach against homosexuality; they did more than
say homosexuality should be illegal. The flyers that the Court took issue
with portrayed homosexuals as an inferior untrustworthy pedophiliac
menace bent on the corruption and exploitation of children.
D.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, the line between free speech and hate speech is still
somewhat blurred. This confusion is the direct result of the Court's definition of hate speech. Because it is defined as speech that could be reasonably considered to harm another, there is an inherently subjective
component to making this determination. Without any evidence of actual
harm, the test can never be truly objective.
Perhaps the Court believed that these flyers would clearly cause harm.
That here, the homosexuals in this area faced an uphill battle as a result
of some of these flyers. Had the defendant merely preached that homosexuality was morally wrong, such action would probably not have risen
to the level of hate speech. But, because the defendant's flyers were
rooted in notions that all homosexuals are pedophiles and all homosexuals seek to corrupt children, the Court thought that his speech did rise to
a level where, from an objective point of view, it could reasonably lead to
the discrimination and harm of another person.
Unquestionably, the genocides that took place over history-that still
take place in some parts of the world today-are built on a foundation of
hateful rhetoric that can be traced directly from the harmful act back to
the inciting statements. And while the Court took great care to explain
that statements which lead to this result are objectively different from
statements that merely cause hurt feelings, perhaps the test for making
16. Id. para. 147.
17. Id. para. 149.
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this determination should be more precisely defined to prevent an unreasonable limitation from being placed on free speech.
II. ONTARIO'S ARTICLING PROBLEM AND THE
LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA'S
PROPOSED SOLUTION
Since the global recession began, lawyers all over the world have had to
deal with a more limited job market. In Canada, specifically Ontario, the
two-tiered system of legal education may be effectively translating this
limited job market into a barrier to licensure. This section will first outline the history and structure of legal education, examine the solution
adopted by the Law Society of Upper Canada, and conclude by considering the implications of this proposal and the alternatives.
A.

LEGAL EDUCATION: LAw SCHOOL AND
THE ARTICLING REQUIREMENT

The current model for legal education in Ontario emerged in 1957.18 It
was a compromise to end several years of conflict between the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Ontario professoriate. 1 9 The conflict was
fueled by competing views on how legal education should be modeled. 20
On one side the thought was that law schools should teach legal theory in
an academic manner, that they should be teaching students under a system of liberal education. On the other, the Law Society advocated for a
model focused on the occupational aspects of being a lawyer and teaching
students what was practically necessary to actually practice law.
The compromise of 1957 split legal education into two parts; law
schools were free to regulate their own curriculum, and the Law Society
had the power to admit students into its articling program and Bar Admission Course. 2 1 Both components were necessary to be admitted into
practice, and both law school and an articling position remain as requirements to be admitted to practice. The effect of dividing legal education
into two components created an environment during law school largely
premised on academics, where students are primarily taught legal theory
rather than the practice of law. The post-graduate articling program is a
ten-month period where the recent graduate is, in theory, trained and
mentored in the practice of law.2 2
Since 2008, there has been an increasing shortage of articling posi18.

H.W. ARHiiRs, THE TREE OF KNOWLEDEGETHE AXE OF POwER: GERAL.D LE
DAIN AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CANADIAN LEGAL EDucATION, Osgoode

CLPE Research Paper 25/2012, at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Articling Program: What You Need to Know, L. Soc'y OF UPPER CAN. (May

2012), http://www.Isuc.on.ca/ArticlingNeedtoKnowlnfo/.
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tions. 23 This is partly due to the nature of the arrangement; a student
applies to articling principles that have been approved by the Law Society
and hopefully finds a spot. 2 4 Then for ten months the graduate is under
the supervision of an articling principle, a practicing attorney that is basically a volunteer. 25 The positions are generally paid, and can sometimes
lead to permanent employment.
B.

THE GROWING SHORTAGE OF ARTICLING POSITIONS
AND THE LAW SOCIETY'S RESPONSE

Of the graduates in 2008, about 5.8 percent were unable to be placed in
articling positions. 26 This percentage has been steadily rising; by 2012,
the number of graduates unable to be placed was about 15 percent. 27 In
May 2011, the Law Society began responding to this by establishing an
Articling Task Force to investigate and recommend a solution. 28
On October 25, 2012, the task force presented its report. 29 On November 22, 2012, the Convocation approved a pilot program that offers an
alternative to articling. 30 The program, referred to as the "pathways pilot
program," is a Law Practice Program that offers an alternative to articling. 3 ' This alternative is to be established and conducted by a thirdparty provider. 32
The Practice Program will primarily consist of two parts. The first part
is a "simulated experimental component" that will last for about four
months.3 3 The curriculum of this first part is still undetermined. The Law
Society has called for proposals by providers that are due on May 31,
2013.34 The decisions on what curriculum to choose and whether to have
a single or multiple number of providers will presumably be made shortly
after these are received; the pilot program is scheduled to start in the
2014-15 licensing year.3 5
The second part of this program is a work placement requirement that
should last for about four months.3 6 The work placement is basically an
23. Articling Task Force Final Report, L. Soc'v OF UPPER CAN. (Oct. 25, 2012), http://
www.Isuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489848, at 2.
24. Articling Program: What You Need to Know, supra note 22.
25. The Articling Task Force Consultation Report,for the Record, L. Soc'v OF UPPER1
CAN. (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.Isuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=2147486425&langtype=
1033.
26. Articling Task Force Final Report, supra note 23, at 13.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2.
29. Articling Task Force, L. Soc'Y oF UPPER CAN., http://www.Isuc.on.ca/articlingtask-forcel (last visited May 20, 2013).
30. Id.
31. Pathways to Lawyer Licensing, L. Soc'Y oF UPPER CAN., http://www.1suc.on.ca/
with.aspx?id=2147491507 (last visited May 20, 2013).
32. Articling Task Force FinalReport, supra note 23, at 55.
33. Articling Task Force FinalReport, supra note 23, at 57.
34. Law Society Calls for Proposalsfor New Law Practice Program, L. Soc'y or UpPER CAN., http://www.1suc.on.ca/LPP/ (last visited May 20, 2013).
35. Id.
36. Articling Task Force Final Report, supra note 23, at 57.
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internship, which may be unpaid, that will allow the graduates access to
positions not traditional available as articling placements; these include
sole or small practice firms and nonprofit venues.3 7
C. OTHER

ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESS THE SHORTAGE OF
CRUX OF THE PROBLEM

ARTICLING POSITIONS AND THE

There is clearly a problem occurring, as the articling bottleneck indicates, but the question remaining is: whether the shortage of articling
positions indicates a problem with the current articling requirement, or
whether this is merely a symptom of a much larger issue. While the proposed alternative to articling may be a solution to the shortage of articling positions, it very well may cause other problems. The articling
requirement has for several decades remained mostly unchanged, what
has changed is the job market and the way legal services are being
offered.
One thing that has changed, that may be a significant factor in causing
a shortage of articling positions, is the gradual increase in students being
admitted to law school. In 1997, there were 1,091 first year students registered in Ontario's law schools. 3 8 By 2010, this number rose to 1,405.39
When viewed in this light, the problem may not be with the articling requirement, but merely a problem of supply and demand. By removing
the articling bottleneck there may simply be an increase in the number of
lawyers who cannot find permanent employment.
Also, there is already a movement towards national regulation of law
schools, and if this continues perhaps the articling requirement will be
pushed back into the law schools, appearing as a broadening of the already existent clinic programs. 40 While this would remove the bottleneck, it would likely do little more.
The only real solution is a combination of fewer students being admitted to law schools, lawyers retiring at the once traditional retirement age,
and continued economic growth. These are all much larger problems and
some of them may not have an easy solution. But fixing the shortage of
articling positions is unlikely to make things much easier for recent graduates. The shortage of articling positions is likely only a symptom of
these larger causes, and while treating the cause is almost always more
difficult than treating a symptom, it is also the only way to fix the
problem.
37. Articling Task Force Final Report, supra note 23, at 57-58.
38.

Law School Application Statistics, ONTARIO UNIVERSIrIES' APPLICATION CENTRE,

http://www.ouac.on.calstatistics/law-school-application-statistics/ (last visited May
20, 2013).
39. Id.
40. National Requirement for Approving Canadian Common Law Degree Programs,
Fi DERATION OF L. Soc' OF CAN., http://www.flsc.calen/national-requirement-forapproving-canadian-common-law-degree-programs/ (last visited May 20, 2013).
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III. LEGISLATION AND REGULATION UPDATE: POSSIBLE
CHANGES TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING REQUIREMENTS
IN ALBERTA; AN AMENDED WIRETAPPING LAW; THE
CITIZEN'S ARREST AND SELF DEFENCE ACT
A.

ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION BOARD'S DRAFT
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING DIRECTIVE

On December 6, 2012, the Energy Resources Conservation Board released draft regulations affecting hydraulic fracturing and requested feedback on the proposed changes. 41 These new regulations were prompted
by a well blowout that was caused by hydraulic fracturing and occurred
early in 2012.42
If made, the proposed changes would increase the minimum distance
that fracturing operations can occur to water wells, non-saline aquifers,
the bedrock surface, and offset wells. 4 3 These proposed regulations also
include requirements to increase well integrity and prevent interwell
communication. 44 There is also a notification requirement, whereby the
operator would be required to notify the ERCB a minimum of five days
prior to commencing hydraulic fracturing pumping operations. 45
B.

THE RESPONSE TO

R. V. TSE:

CANADA'S AMENDED

WIRETAPPING LAW

Last year the Supreme Court of Canada declared an emergency wiretap statute unconstitutional. 46 The Court suspended enforcement of this
decision for one year, so Parliament would have an opportunity to redraft
the law.4 7 The new bill received Royal Assent on March 27, 2013.48
The current law now requires that the person whose communications
were intercepted must be notified within ninety days; this deadline may
only be extended by a judge. 49 The new law also requires annual reports
on the use of these wiretaps be made available to the public and restricts
the laws use to police officers; previously the law applied to the much
broader category of "peace officers." 50
41. ERCB Bulletin 2013-02, ERCB (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.ercb.ca/bulletins/Bulletin-2013-02.pdf.
42. David Both & A.W. (Sandy) Carpenter, Blowout Caused by Fracking Leads to
New Regulations, FASKEN MARTINEAU (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/

library/detail.aspx?g=1242a5a0-3765-4061-81a2-ace96283c95d.
43. ERCB Draft Directive: Hydraulic Fracturing, ERCB, (December 2012), http://
www.ercb.ca/directives/DraftDirective-HydraulicFracturing.pdf, at 4-7.
44. Id. at 2-5.
45. Id. at 8.
46. R. v. Tse, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531, para. 103 (Can.).
47. Id. para 102.
48. News Release, Dep't of Justice Can., Legislation Responding to Supreme Court
Decision in R v. Tse Receives Royal Assent (Mar 27, 2013), http://www.justice.gc.
ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp2013/doc_32871.html.
49. Bill C-55, Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act,
§ 6, (Assented to, Mar. 27, 2013).
50. Id. §§ 4-5; News Release, supra note 48.
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On March 11, 2013, the Citizen's Arrest and Self Defence Act came
into force.5 ' First, it should be noted that a citizen's arrest is only permitted as a response to a property related crime, such as shoplifting or
carjacking. 52 The new law makes two important changes. Previously, a
citizen's arrest could only be made if the person actually caught the criminal in the act.5 3 Now a citizen's arrest can be made within a reasonable
time after the person committed the crime if it would not be feasible for
the police to do so; the arrested individual must still be promptly delivered to the police. 5 4 Second, this new law simplifies the standard for selfdefense. The new standard only requires a person to act reasonably
under the circumstances.5 5 The law contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court should consider when determining whether the person's belief and response were reasonable.5 6

51. News Release, Dep't of Justice Can., Backgrounder: Citizen's Power of Arrest and
Self-Defence and Defence of Property, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nrcp/2013/doc_32865.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2013).
52. Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act, S.C. 2012, c. 9, § 3 (Can.).
53. News Release, supra note 51.
54. Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act, S.C. 2012, c. 9, § 3 (Can.).
55. Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act, S.C. 2012, c. 9, § 2 (Can.).
56. Id.
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